Security polish (audit F5-F6): disable broad allowMixedContent on Android (loopback cleartext stays via network_security_config); document CVM client's intentional fixed data-relay set + IP-disclosure privacy note

Co-authored-by: shakespeare.diy <assistant@shakespeare.diy>

capacitor.config.ts

@@ -10,8 +10,16 @@ const config: CapacitorConfig = {
     androidScheme: 'https',
   },
   android: {
-    // Allow mixed content for Nostr WebSocket connections
+    // Cleartext is NOT needed here for Nostr: all public relays are wss:// and
-    allowMixedContent: true,
+    // are unaffected by this flag. The only cleartext endpoint is the optional
+    // local Citrine relay (ws://127.0.0.1:4869), which is permitted specifically
+    // and safely via res/xml/network_security_config.xml (loopback-only), NOT by
+    // this broad mixed-content switch. Keeping this false avoids silently
+    // allowing insecure sub-resources on the https-scheme app shell.
+    // NOTE: if the local Citrine relay ever fails to connect on a device after
+    // this change, fix it in network_security_config.xml (loopback cleartext),
+    // not by re-enabling global mixed content.
+    allowMixedContent: false,
     // Capture input for hardware back button
     captureInput: true,
     // Use the app's dark background for the splash

src/hooks/useCVMClient.ts

@@ -12,6 +12,20 @@ import { useNostr } from '@nostrify/react';
 
 //  Relay list 
 
+/**
+ * Fixed set of PUBLIC data relays this discovery client queries.
+ *
+ * Intentionally NOT the user's personal NIP-65 relays: this hook powers the
+ * community content browser (spots, events, Lab, gear, crews, shops, tours),
+ * and that content is spread across the community's shared relays — a user's
+ * own relay set would return an incomplete, inconsistent view. So we always
+ * query the canonical skate-data relays regardless of personal config.
+ *
+ * PRIVACY NOTE: because these are fixed, a query here reveals the user's IP to
+ * these three relay operators even if the user configured different relays
+ * elsewhere in the app. This is disclosed on the Privacy page. All data queried
+ * is public; the private encrypted Stash is never touched by this client.
+ */
 const DATA_RELAYS = [
   'wss://goskatespots.nostr1.com',
   'wss://relay.ditto.pub',